The history of the concept of eclecticism
The history of the concept of eclecticism
Antiquity knew both the concept of eclectic philosophy and the term itself, but both were much less widespread than their popularity in modern times would lead one to think. The idea that a philosophy could show the combined influence of other thinkers was by no means unusual in the classical world: we need only be reminded of the way Aristotle explains Plato's thought in the first book of Metaphysics as a creative blend of the philosophies of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Socrates, and the Pythagoreans (A6.987a29ff.). Likewise, the idea that a particular doctrine or philosophical statement could be the result of the combination of 10510t191k two or more others was fairly common. But the ancients never
In writing this paper I have been greatly helped by the
discussion that followed my first draft, read at the FIEC Congress in
― 16 ―
labeled these two kinds of mixture eclecticism . When this term is employed, it has an entirely different meaning: it means a philosophy whose structural character is that of deliberately planning to select some doctrines out of many philosophies and fit them together.
There are, however, only a few known examples of the use of the term in this sense. The most important one is in Diogenes Laertius, who says that "an eclectic school was introduced by Potamo of Alexandria, who made a selection from the tenets of all the existing sects" (1.21, trans. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library), the meaning of the Greek verb eklegein/eklegesthai being precisely "to choose, to make a selection." In connection with Diogenes' statement about Potamo it is very interesting to find that an "eclectic philosopher" from Alexandria is mentioned in an inscription from Ephesus which has recently been published. Another instance of the term is provided by the Christian writer Clement of Alexandria: he calls his own ideal of the philosophical method eklektikon (Strom . 1.37.6). Finally, it should be remarked that Galen twice speaks of a medical school which is called eklektike by some people. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to say whether the name was first given to this medical school and then transferred to Potamo's philosophy or whether the reverse happened.
― 17 ―
If eclecticism has by this date become a relatively technical notion, its origins, in the sense used by Clement-constituting a corpus of theories by selecting from many doctrines-have roots at least as far back as Xenophon. He makes Socrates speak of readings from the works of ancient wise men, "which we select [eklegometha ] on the basis of whatever we perceive good" in them; and there are other examples of this use of the term. But until the Roman period neither this idea nor the term eklegein may yet have established a regular place in philosophy. A fragment of Epicurus's work OnNature is particularly interesting, because it seems to contain a distinction between the constructive use of someone else's doctrines and the "confused mixture" of ideas deriving from different sources; but neither here nor in an apparently similar passage of Theophrastus is the verb eklegein or any of its derivatives employed. Nor, it seems, is such a distinction familiar to other ancient writers.
― 18 ―
To sum up, we may say that the very few ancient thinkers who described their own philosophy as "eclecticism" gave a dearly positive meaning to this term, that these authors did not represent schools of major importance, and, finally, that there are traces of a distinction between a good and a bad mixture of doctrines emanating from divergent origins.
When compared with the very limited evidence from antiquity, the many references in modem histories of philosophy to eclecticism or eclectics as typical features of later Greek thought may thus seem excessive. Even more remarkable is the fact that the use of these terms in modem times has not reflected the same point of view, but has undergone many changes from the Renaissance to the present. Nowadays everyone agrees that eclecticism, viewed as a general feature of a stage of ancient thought, was a very bad thing; that philosophy from the end of the second century B.C. , or from the first century B.C. to Plotinus, was bad, and that it was bad above all because it was eclectic, is a widespread conviction even among Classical scholars. But few among them seem to be aware that there was a long period in philosophical historiography and in European thought in which eclecticism was nothing less than the ideal toward which philosophy aimed and which was accepted as a model by intellectual historians. In the chief monument of this historiography in the eighteenth century, Jakob Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae , one discovers that "the eclectic method of philosophizing, long approved by intelligent men and practiced by philosophers of the greatest ability," produced its greatest works in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, thanks to the great philosophers who founded modem thought by fighting against sectarian ideas and the principle of authority ; so Brucker presents philosophers
― 19 ―
such as Giordano Bruno, Francis Bacon, Campanella, Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, and Christian Thomasius as "men who renewed the universal eclectic philosophy." The article Eclectisme written by Diderot for the Encyclopédie contained a flattering definition of an eclectic which, like most of the article, is in fact derived from, or almost translated from, Brucker.
The eclectic is a philosopher who, trampling underfoot prejudice, tradition, antiquity, general agreement, authority-in a word, everything that controls the minds of the common herd-dares to think for himself, returns to the clearest general principles, examines them, discusses them, admits nothing that is not based on the testimony of his experience and his reason; and from all the philosophies he has analyzed without respect and bias he makes for himself a particular and domestic one which belongs to him.... There is no leader of a sect who has not been more or less eclectic.... The Eclectics are among the philosophers who are the kings on the face of the earth, the only ones who have remained in the state of nature, where everything belonged to everyone.
(trans. A.A. Long)
In these authors, so great is the praise of eclecticism as a philosophical attitude opposed to dogmatism, to sectarian ideas, and
― 20 ―
to the principle of authority that they state that anyone who becomes a faithful disciple of an eclectic philosophy loses by this very fact the right of being considered eclectic.
Brucker and Diderot were not even innovators; their praise
of philosophical eclecticism was the result of long studies and positive
evaluation of the concept of eclecticism which began to develop in
― 21 ―
But for historians of ancient thought it may be particularly
interesting to note that in Brucker and Diderot the high estimate of eclectic
philosophy was not at all connected with a similar evaluation of ancient
eclecticism. This eclecticism, they said, had been professed by Alexandrian
Platonists, starting with Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus, i.e., by those whom we
now call Neo-platonists. (The link between Ammonius and Potamo, who was the
only person ancient tradition undeniably called an eclectic, was, besides, very
difficult to prove.) But the Platonic eclectics of
― 22 ―
phy. Diderot was perhaps only slightly less harsh in his general remarks on syncretism. But the total judgment which historians in the period of the Enlightenment passed on eclectic philosophy in antiquity remained very unfavorable; and it determined the outlook of later historians.
However, in the last decades of the eighteenth century;
while the popularity of the Historia critica in Europe continued, the change of
philosophical outlook in
In order to discuss Zeller's views with some accuracy we ought
― 23 ―
also to consider other developments which had taken place in the meantime in philosophical historiography. One was the popularity of the term Neoplatonism and the distinction between the Neoplatonic school and eclecticism. (Thus in Zeller Neoplatonism was no longer eclecticism, although somehow eclecticism had prepared the way for it.) Another development was that, while being impoverished by separation from the independent philosophical tradition of Neoplatonism, eclecticism in a looser sense expanded and came to stand for a general feature of philosophical thought from the end of the second, or from the first, century B.C. up to Plotinus. It is obviously impossible to explain in detail all this change as well, but anyone who reads Zeller's account of the general features of eclecticism can have no doubts about his strongly unfavorable judgment. We find a great number of expressions such as "the dying out of a scientific outlook," "scientific decline," "a merely exterior connection between different positions," and "uncritical philosophizing." It is tempting to say that Zeller calls eclecticism what Brucker called syncretism, yet the meaning of the judgment remains exactly the same. It is striking, however, that Zeller does not even attempt to define philosophical eclecticism exactly; he seems to assume that its existence, as well as the scope of the concept, is obvious. Yet when Zeller uses the term eclecticism as a huge generalization, making no attempt to establish a precise link with the only ancient philosophical tradition for which the name is attested, he may well seem guilty of carelessness. But the worst is to come.
Instead of providing a definition of eclecticism, Zeller preferred to give two principal explanations of the origin of the phenomenon, in a section with the significant title "Origin and Character of Eclecticism" ("Entstehungsgründe und Charakter des Eklekticismus"). One reason was intrinsic to the development of Greek philosophy; the other he derived from the general historical situation. According to Zeller, the intrinsic reason was the protracted debate among the philosophical schools. It is extremely important to note here that the only ones concerned are
― 24 ―
the three great Hellenistic schools, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Academic Skepticism. Though Zeller never stated this presupposition fully or even explicitly, the subsequent parts of his discussion make it quite obvious. The "very nature of things" (these or similar words occur frequently in the chapter in question, with eclecticism appearing in the end as the logical result of a natural process) entails this consequence: as the debate dies out between the founders and upholders of different systems, each of whom was eager to stress his own point of view and to underline divergences from other schools, and as quarrels abate, those points that the different doctrines have in common emerge; all the more so, since these doctrines had originated from a common ground. (This is an unmistakable hint of the origin of eclecticism from the three great Hellenistic philosophies.) Once this happens, the typical refusal of the Skeptics ("neither this nor that") changes into the eclectic reconciliation of different positions: "both this and that."
Several points in this reconstruction cause misgivings. In the first place Zeller stresses the role of Academic Skepticism as really paving the way for eclecticism and believes that the idea of "immediate knowledge," which is the fundamental principle of eclecticism, goes back to skeptical attitudes. He therefore believes that it was "not at all accidental" that it was precisely "the successors of Carneades" who were the chief source from which eclectic attitudes developed. It is clear, however, that he consid-
― 25 ―
ers some Stoics who go as far back as the second century B.C. , such as Boethus and Panaetius, to be eclectics, and one therefore wonders how these men, who can hardly be included among Carneades' successors, could have become eclectics. But Zeller's theory has an even more objectionable limitation in that it attempts to trace the origins of eclecticism solely to the interaction among the three major Hellenistic philosophies. This theory would have point only if so-called eclecticism had been a contact between and a mixture of the doctrines of the Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic schools. But it is well known that events turned out quite differently. Epicureanism remained almost completely free from external influences, and it did not influence in an eclectic manner any important thinker (with the exception of Seneca, who was a completely peculiar and isolated instance). Moreover-and this is the most important point-we do not know of a single instance of a mixture only of Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic positions. From the time of Zeller himself, in fact, eclecticism is a completely different phenomenon from the one postulated in this theory. It is, rather, the contact and mutual interaction between the Hellenistic philosophies, particularly Stoicism, and three other philosophies which went back to a previous age and indeed had undergone a considerable decline in the Hellenistic period: dogmatic Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Pythagoreanism. Zeller's theory has no explanation to offer for this renewal of philosophies whose origin was earlier than the Hellenistic age, for the contact between them and their reaction to Stoicism-in short, for everything that actually happened between Panaetius and Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Equally questionable is the second reason adduced by Zeller, the external cause. In his view this was the influence of the Roman frame of mind, whose typical feature was a highly practical
― 26 ―
and moral outlook. (This view of the Roman frame of mind seems to be one of the most successful fables convenues in Classical studies.) If such influence had really existed and had had a really decisive effect on philosophy, eclecticism would necessarily have turned out to be a sort of moralizing Stoic-Skeptical-Epicurean lingua franca . In fact it is well known that precisely in the Roman period, philosophies with metaphysical interests or foundations, such as Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Pythagoreanism, emerged again and helped to create a new vision of the world in which metaphysics had an ever-growing role. It is also well known that precisely in that period the pre-Hellenistic ideal of pure speculation (theoria ) reappeared and became widespread. (It is remarkable that one of the first vigorous confirmations of this ideal is found in the Roman, Seneca.) Thus Zeller's theory on the origin and nature of eclecticism is a typical example of a priori argument; it explains wonderfully what never happened, while leaving what actually happened totally unexplained. The time has come to think again about the real problem: the sudden reappearance, almost at the same time, of dogmatic Platonism and Aristotelianism, as well as Pythagoreanism, and the interaction of these three philosophies with Hellenistic philosophy, especially Stoicism.
It has not been pleasant to criticize a historian to whom every student of ancient thought is still enormously indebted. Nevertheless, this was necessary. Zeller was chiefly responsible for disseminating a negative and unfavorable concept of eclecticism which until a few years ago almost completely prevailed in the study of ancient philosophy. No one who used this concept
― 27 ―
after Zeller reexamined its theoretical foundations, and no one noticed that it was unable to keep dose to the actual evidence. This, however, does not mean that things have not changed at all from Zeller's time to the present day. Some developments in subsequent studies in the long run weakened the foundations of Zeller's theory.
The point that seems to have caused most dissatisfaction among scholars was the excessively generic nature of the concept of eclecticism, its application without distinction to several centuries of the history of thought. It soon became dear that undifferentiated eclecticism ignored the many differences between thinkers in the period from Panaetius to Plotinus. Further distinctions were therefore devised to do justice to these.
There is not much to say on the attempt made by some scholars to put forward again the old distinction between eclecticism and syncretism. According to the definition given by the most explicit upholder of this distinction, syncretism is only "the superficial and unauthentic agreement of the heterogeneous and disparate elements whose irreducible differences are blurred"; eclecticism, according to him, shows a greater degree of conceptual accuracy, since it is "the reunion by juxtaposition of reconcilable philosophical theses. The eclectic chooses, makes a selection," even though he still lacks a synthetic and organizing point of view that can create a unity which is more than a mere juxtaposition. As one can see, however, this is not exactly Brucker's or Diderot's distinction. Not even the term eclecticism has a fully positive meaning here: it betokens a degree of confusion and superficiality that is only slightly lower than that of syncretism. Nor does the distinction reflect the substance of the text of Epicurus mentioned above (p. 17). But the absence of ancient supporting evidence is not its greatest fault. Basically it errs in being completely divorced from the intentions of the ancient authors
― 28 ―
and in relying completely on the intuitions of modem interpreters, who in each instance have to decide whether a given philosopher should be included among eclectics or be confined to the shameful circle of syncretists. Finally; the distinction has the weakness of not being generally accepted by historians of philosophy; the word syncretism is largely used now as a technical term in the history of religion, and, above all, ancient religions; when it is still used in the history of philosophy it seems on the whole not to differ from eclecticism .
The distinction between eclectic and orthodox philosophers, which Karl Praechter invented, was far more widespread. According to this point of view those philosophers could be considered orthodox who strove to remain loyal to an original core of doctrines held to be essential to, and typical of, the school from which they drew their name, and who in many cases were hostile to the intrusion of alien doctrines. Those who had no such concern and were open to extraneous influences were eclectic. A considerable advantage of this distinction was its applicability to all philosophical schools: thus among Platonists, Atticus and Taurus were typically orthodox, whereas "Albinus" and Apuleius were definitely eclectic; among Stoics, Epictetus was orthodox, while Seneca was absolutely eclectic and Marcus Aurelius was eclectic to a lesser extent; among Aristotelians, Alexander was orthodox and contrasted with the eclectic Aristocles.
Clarity and the ease with which it could be applied are doubtless qualities in favor of Praechter's classification. Yet in this case
― 29 ―
too the defects in the end turn out to be greater than the virtues. The absence of any recognition of just this distinction from Classical philosophy is not particularly serious; one could say that when Atticus rejects Aristotelian doctrines he in fact contrasts his own orthodox Platonism with his opponents' eclectic interpretation. But such a suggestion could not be the basis for a reasonable classification of all Platonists (or of all the philosophers of the other schools) under the two headings of eclectic and orthodox. What good reasons are there for accepting Atticus as the standard of Platonic orthodoxy? By treating him as such (as Praechter did), we would simply adopt in an uncritical manner his own point of view, without taking into account the fact that Atticus himself was considered by later Platonists to have been a philosopher who had abandoned the school's tradition. We would also be guilty of serious injustice to the intentions of the other side. Most so-called eclectics were honestly persuaded that they were loyal to the school's tradition; on the other hand, even so-called orthodox philosophers were often exposed to external influences whose importance was underestimated by Praechter and his followers.
For these reasons Praechter's distinction appears today less and less convincing, and several suggestions for correcting the worst faults of the previous approaches are now available. The
― 30 ―
most recent is also the one that has been most carefully thought out. In his introduction to the second volume of his monumental work on Greek Aristotelianism, Paul Moraux proposes a distinction between de facto orthodoxy and intentional orthodoxy: the latter would then also apply to nearly all the philosophers who are traditionally considered eclectic, such as "Albinus," insofar as they at least appear sincerely convinced that they are presenting the genuine version of their school's doctrine, even when they insert elements of different origins. Moraux, however, makes it important to show that external elements are accepted only when they are considered useful in clarifying, completing, or defending the doctrine of the school. Examples of this are the acceptance by Aristotle of Mytilene of Stoic doctrines and of Aristotelian ones by "Albinus." Similarly, Moraux seems to achieve a more precise definition of the concept of eclecticism. Although he continues to speak of "undeniable" or "effective" eclecticism with regard to authors who accept doctrines not belonging to their own schools, he is careful to distinguish this eclecticism, which may very easily be reconciled with full and loyal membership in a philosophical school, from Galen's eclecticism stated as a guiding principle: the latter consists in a refusal to belong to any previously established system, either of philosophy or medicine, and has nothing to do with "a more or less casual and arbitrary combination of elements coming from different sources." "Galen's choice ... is seen as always having scientific foundations. Galen's eclecticism is the immediate result of his strict scientific ideal." Other scholars in recent times have already noted Galen's quite special position. Thus a fully positive and honorable sense of eclecticism has reappeared in the history of philosophy.
― 31 ―
This review shows that the term eclecticism has been used by modern historians (after Zeller) to indicate different philosophical attitudes with a number of different senses. Let us try to enumerate these for the sake of clarity.
1. There is first of all the negative meaning of the term, originating chiefly from Zeller and denoting a combination of heterogeneous elements that is substantially uncritical and more or less deliberate. In this sense the term has undergone a strong decline in recent years. (In the sense employed by Praechter, involving the antithesis between eclecticism and orthodoxy, the term is indeed dying out.) The more penetrating the interpretation of individual authors once contemptuously defined as eclectic becomes, the more inadequate this sense of eclecticism appears. After the most recent studies it seems very difficult to dismiss and condemn as eclectic authors such as Arius Didymus, Plutarch and the Middle Platonists in general, or even, I should like to add, Seneca.
2. The term may be used as a statement of fact, without any positive or negative implications: it simply states that the doctrine of a philosophical school is combined in an author's thought with elements of a different origin.
3. Eclecticism is also defined as the more or less arbitrary attitude of authors who accept into the doctrine of their own school extraneous elements because they are honestly convinced that these are compatible with, and indeed helpful in explaining or defending, their own doctrine.
4. The eclectic attitude of Potamo and Clement, which is completely deliberate and stated at the outset, can obviously continue to be described as eclecticism.
5. More recent discussions indicate, however, that this attitude must be distinguished from another one, which chooses among doctrines with the same deliberate program but whose spirit is strongly anti-dogmatic and anti-sectarian. The typical example is Galen.
― 32 ―
6. Finally, although it has not yet been mentioned, there is a sixth attitude, which must be distinguished as absolutely different from all previous ones and which is often called eclectic. It is the posture of Antiochus of Ascalon, who tried to prove the basic agreement between Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism and tended to make these three schools coincide and form a single common doctrine. Now even if the results obtained by Antiochus may seem similar to those of eclecticism of types (1) and (3), his point of departure is completely idiosyncratic. Was there anyone who really adopted it after him? Platonists open to Aristotelian influence may in a certain sense be considered his heirs. But who among them was equally open to Stoicism as well? To conclude, it seems that Antiochus's position is indeed very personal, and it is better to consider it sui generis.
So we have available today no fewer than six different interpretations of the concept of eclecticism: this may cause some dizziness. Other interpretations are perhaps possible and may have escaped me; others will probably be suggested by this book. If, however, I may be allowed to state what lesson I think I have learned from the account just given, my impression is that it is now wise to use great caution in applying such an ambiguous term. The history of the discussion seems to produce an exhortation to employ the term sparingly: in fact, as was said above, sense (1) is already disappearing, and according to some scholars, sense (6), namely Antiochus, has in fact nothing to do with eclecticism. A further widening of senses (4) and (5) seems difficult in the light of the warning, often proclaimed in recent years, that eclecticism as a deliberate plan was a rare and un-
― 33 ―
usual position in antiquity and essentially foreign to the traditions and philosophical customs of the Hellenistic and Roman ages, where the desire to look back to a well-defined school or tradition is always evident. In fact Potamo and Clement had no followers in pagan philosophy. As for Galen's anti-dogmatic eclecticism, it is difficult to find even one ancient philosopher who reproduces his features exactly. Perhaps Seneca alone might be compared with him on account of his critical attention to themes of contemporary Platonism and Epicureanism and his frequent claims of intellectual freedom and independence; but in fact he remains different. In my judgment there is either no eclecticism in Seneca or there is a hint of a further widening of the meaning of the term.
It seems therefore that only senses (2) and (3) may be effectively and widely applied. However, the former of these is also open to objections. While it is true that it seems rather harmless and comfortable, perhaps it is innocent only because it has not much capacity to explain things: it registers the facts but does not make their qualities and causes clear. When we acknowledge that a doctrine is composite, we can hardly avoid asking ourselves how and why it was put together. We shall then inevitably be compelled to answer the question by changing our innocent eclecticism into another one, for the most part belonging to sense (1) or (3).