HAECCEITISM
As originally introduced, this is the doctrine that holds ". that it does make sense to ask-without reference to common attributes and behavior-whether this is the same individual in another possible world, that individuals can be extended in logical space (i.e. through possible worlds) in much the same way we commonly regard them as being extended in physical space and time, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisness may underlie great resemblance .". 40 Lewis has considered whether
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a belief in haecceities is either necessary or sufficient to maintain haecceitism and has concluded that it is neither. However, this conclusion hinges on a particular construal of haecceity and his own philosophical view of properties or attributes. Thus he insists that one might expound haecceitism, without believing in haecceities, where the latter are understood as non-qualitative properties (such as self-identity)-one might be a nominalist, for example, and reject properties altogether. 41 Of course, such a nominalist then owes us an account of individuality sufficient for maintaining haecceitism. On the other hand, he argues, one might reject the doctrine but accept haecceities, again in the sense of a non-qualitative property (where properties in general are identified with sets of possible individuals). The further acceptance of haecceitism is then avoided by giving an account of trans-world identity in terms of his theory of counterparts. 42
Clearly there are important issues here, to do with how we understand the very notion of a property and also that of a possible world. We shall merely note that T I meshes well with haecceitism but that one could accept the latter and not haecceities in the sense of primitive thisness, or the non-qualitative property of self-identity, if one were to understand T I à la Locke, for example, in terms of substance. 43
Could one accept haecceitism and understand individuality in terms of ST I? Presumably in order to talk of the same individual in different possible worlds on such a view one would have to impose a constraint on these possible worlds such that the underlying space-time background is the same. Obvious problems arise with regard to the suggestion that one might talk of the same individual in, say, worlds with Euclidean and non-Euclidean space-times. 44
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Furthermore, the Impenetrability Assumption would have to be given a modal spin to ensure that it holds appropriately across possible worlds. In other words, one would have to consider the transworld identity of space-time points. Leaving this esoterica aside, we have set out the bare bones of haecceitism here because some have found it useful in considering the impact of physics on the metaphysics of individuality. We shall briefly return to it in Chapter 2.
Finally, let us now turn to our third question: what is it that confers trans-temporal identity upon individuals?
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